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From this brief sketch of the subject, it is apparent that there is a
great deal of confusion in the decided cases. From a logical standpoint the
whole doctrine seems to lack support. The chief weakness of the doctrine
is that it is contrary to the established theory of damages that of compensation to the injured person. However, from a legal standpoint the doctrine
is well fixed in practically all of the states. While many courts have followed
the doctrine more because of precedent than anything else, it nevertheless
appears to be a doctrine so well established that it will not readily be done
away with. In fact, it is so well established that some courts refuse altogether to discuss it from a logical standpoint, but decide the case on precedent alone.0 7 On the other hand there are opinions in which the doctrine has
been ridiculed. But even in these cases, the courts have still followed the
rule of precedent in the end. Our Indiana courts have several times disagreed
with the whole doctrine; and possibly this attitude has been one reason for
our unusual rule where the wrong involved is also a crime.6 8
As a practical matter, however, the allowance of this type of damage
often times may not be so serious. Take for instance the unlimited power
of the jury in assessing damages for injuries to the feelings and other
losses not strictly pecuniary in character. The Indiana court has time and
again allowed recovery for these; and since they are often indefinite, the
jury has unlimited power in assessing them. 9 A Wisconsin case will
illustrate that exemplary damages may not always be unjust. 70

The case

was tried in the lower court three times; at two of the trials the jury was
instructed that exemplary damages could be allowed. At the other trial,
they were instructed no exemplary damages could be allowed, but that they
might allow an amount for wounded feelings. The significant thing is that
the jury returned the same verdict in all three cases. It is just human nature
that juries do such things.
It must be admitted that there are strong arguments either for or against
the doctrine. In fact, a wealth of material is available for either position.
But in spite of all arguments, the doctrine has survived and, in conclusion,
we must concede that the doctrine will continue to remain a fixed part of
our substantive law.
CLAUSES EXCLUDING AVIATION INJURY AND DEATH AS
RISKS NOT ASSUMED IN LIFE OR ACCIDENT
INSURANCE POLICY
BYRON K. ELLIOTT*

The risk of death or injury from aeronautics, like the risk incident to
underwater navigation, was for many years too indeterminable and costly
to be included in the average life, health or accident insurance policy at the
regular premiums. Therefore, many insurance companies sought to exclude
67

Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. (U. S.) 371.

68 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Bierhaus, 8 Lid. App. 563.

69 Moyer v. Gordon, 113 Ind. 282. This case involved an action for forcible entry.
The court held that no exemplary damages could be recovered, but that the jury might
take into consideration the bodily and mental suffering, injury to pride and social
position and the shame and humilitiation at having his wife and family turned out in
street. See also Nossaman v. Rickert, 18 Ind. 350.
70 Bass v. Railway Co., 36 Wis. 450, 39 Wis. 636, 42 Wis. 654.
* General Solicitor, John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, Boston, Mass.
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it from the coverage of their contracts, and frequently made use of a clause
somewhat as follows:
"No benefit shall be payable under this policy for injury or death while
insured is engaged in aeronautic or submarine operations."
As aviation developed and travel by regularly established airlines became
a common experience, the courts supplied authorities construing these older
clauses. New phraseology followed to meet the new conditions and the
decisions on the older forms. A later and widely used clause today is the
following:
"Death as a result of service, travel or flight in any species of aircraft,
except as a fare-paying passenger, is a risk not assumed under this policy;
but if the insured shall die as a result, directly or indirectly, of such service,
travel or flight, the company will pay to the beneficiary the reserve on this
policy."
Under the varying phraseology used to indicate that death or injury from
an aviation accident was not a risk covered by the policy, it becomes material
to ascertain the exact facts surrounding the accident. The object of the
flight, the part taken in it by the insured and the manner of injury are all
to be considered. For this reason, it is more convenient to classify the
authorities by the circumstances surrounding the injury than it is to group
them under any particular phraseology contained in a policy.
I.

Crash Instances-Passengers

The most familiar distinction is that between "engaging in" aviation activities and "participating" therein. The courts have frequently held that a
passenger who does nothing towards operating the plane is not "engaged in"
aviation or aeronautics or aeronautic operations or expeditions, although he
may be "participating in" some form of aeronautics.
The Indiana Supreme Court has had such a case before it. In Masonic
Accident Insurance Company v. Jackson' an accident insurance policy contained, in part, the following clause:
"Indemnity under this policy shall not be payable for any death or
disability that may be caused or contributed to, wholly or in part by any
while engaged in aviation or balloon*
of the following causes: *
*

ing

*

*"

The insured, passenger in an airplane, was killed in a crash. The court
found no error in overruling a demurrer to the complaint, saying:
"Thus it may be observed that the phrase 'engaged in aviation' denotes
and suggests permanency, or continuity, or frequency of action, and does not
aptly describe a single isolated act of riding in an airplane as a passenger."
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in
Goldsmith v. New York Life 2 reviews the various authorities and comes
to the following "fairly definite conclusions" upon clauses which seek to
exclude aviation deaths:
"(1) The words, 'participating as a passenger or otherwise in aeronautics or aviation,' 'participating as a passenger or otherwise in aeronautic
activity,' or 'participating as a passenger or otherwise in aeronautic expeditions,' cover a passenger in an airplane.
"(2) The words, 'engaged in aviation or aeronautics,' 'engaged in aeronautic operations,' 'engaged in aeronautic activity,' or 'engaged in aeronautic
expeditions,' do not cover the ordinary passenger in an airplane."
1 (1929)
2

200 Ind. 472, 164 N. E. 628, 61 A. L. R. 840.

(1934) 69 F. (2d) 273.
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The court bad before it a clause excepting from the double indemnity
benefit death resulting "from engaging as a passenger or otherwise, in submarine or aeronautic expeditions." The company paid the face of the
policy, and was freed from liability for double indemnity (accidental death
benefit), the court saying:
"While both the word 'participate' and the word 'engage' mean, among
other things, to take part in, it is held that 'engage' is ordinarily understood
to refer to an occupation or employment or continued activity, so that, in
reading a policy which denied coverage to one engaged in aeronautics, it
might properly be construed as not excluding a mere casual passenger in an
airplane, but as referring to one who made aeronautics his vocation or took
some active part in the operation of the plane. It cannot be denied, however,
that one may temporarily engage in taking a short trip or in writing a letter
or in casual conversation, so that the meaning or scope of the word 'engaged'
may be made entirely clear by its association with other words."
The following brief reference to other cases shows in quotations the point
of the exclusion clause involved in the decision, and indicates the court's
holding:
Padgett v. Metropolitan Life3 "that death shall not have resulted from
bodily injuries sustained while participating in aviation or aeronautics, except
as a fare-paying passenger

*

*

*."

Double indemnity denied on policy

of insured who paid no fare to ride with his employer who held a private
pilot's license not authorizing transportation for hire.
First National Bank of Chattanooga v. Phoenix Mutual 4 : "directly or
indirectly, wholly or partly, * * * from participation in aeronautic
* * * operations." Double indemnity denied on policy of president of
aircraft company who, against advice of a licensed pilot his company
regularly employed, directed that trip be made so he could see sick wife.
Insured had interposed his own judgment.
Head v. New York Life:5 "participation as a passenger or otherwise
in aviation or aeronautics." Passenger, with pilot, has a part in flying in
the air and is participating.
Provident Trust Co. v. Equitable Life Assurance Society:6 "if death
shall * * * be the result of or be caused directly or indirectly by
*

*

*

engaging as a passenger or otherwise in

*

*

*

aeronautic

expeditions." Double indemnity awarded oi policy of fare-paying passenger
on regularly scheduled flight.
Missouri State Life v. Martin :7 "participation in aviation or submarine
operations." Double indemnity allowed where insured, as invited guest of
friend, was on his first flight. On rehearing, the court rejected difference
between "engaged" and "participation," emphasizing the word "operations."
Martin v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York:8 Same accident
as Missouri State v. Martin. "Participation in aeronautics." Invited guest
entitled to double indemnity, court declining distinction between "participate"
and "engage."
Gibbs v. Equitable Life Assurance Society:" "engaging as a passenger
or otherwise in submarine or aeronautic expeditions." Court thought that
3 (N. C., 1934) 173 S. E. 903.
(U. S. S. C. A., 6th Circ., 1933) 62 Fed. (2d) 681.
5 (1930, U. S. C. C. A., 10th Circ.) 43 Fed. (2d) 517.
6 (Pa., 1934) 172 A. 701.
7 (Ark., 1934) 69 S. W. (2d) 1081.
8 (Ark., 1934) 71 S. W. (2d) 694.
9 (1931) 256 N. Y. 208, 176 N. E. 144, reversing 246 N. Y. S. 560.
4
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Nvhen policy was issued in 1924, all air trips were considered expeditions, and
denied recovery.
Flanders v. Benefit Association of Railway Employees :10 "while engaged
in aeronautics." Passenger in ship piloted by friend. "Engaged" held to
mean more than a single trip and recovery allowed."
II.

Propeller and Other Accidents Before or After Flight

With immense crowds gathering at airports and hundreds of thousands
of people flying, it is not surprising to find injuries resulting from contact
with the propeller or another part of the ship while it is on the ground.
Such an accident could hardly be excluded by the usual clauses unless it
constituted some step incident to use of the ship.
In Blonski v. Bankers Life Co. 12 the insured, preparing to take a flight
as a passenger, is injured when he steps up and spins the propeller. His
disability benefits are not payable for injury while "engaging or participating
as a passenger or otherwise in aviation or aeronautics." The court held his
acts to be within this clause.
In Murphy v. Union Indemnity Company 13 an accident policy excepted
injuries while "in or on any vehicle * * * for aerial navigation." Recovery was denied where insured was struck by a revolving propeller while
attempting to board a seaplane.
Insured was part owner of the airplane involved in Pittman v. Lamar
Life Insurance Co.' 4 He alighted from the plane and walked into the propeller. His death was held to have occurred "while participating or as a
result of participation in any submarine or aeronautic expedition or activity,
either as a passenger or otherwise * * *," the court saying:
"The term 'aeronautic activity' is broad enough to cover what is ordinarily
incident to an airplane trip. The aeronautic activities of one who takes such
a trip do not begin or end with the actual flight, but include his presence or
movements in or near to the machine incidental to beginning or concluding
the trip."
A passenger, in Tierney v. Accidental Life Ins. Co. 15 stepped from the
ship into the propeller. The California Supreme Court here held the company liable, although the policy covered no injury received "while participating or in consequence of having participated in aeronautics."
Motor trouble forced down the seaplane, involved in Wendorff v. Missouri
State Life Ins. Co. 16 but no one appeared to be injured until it capsized.
Thereafter insured was found dead in the water, his head displaying signs
of some injury. The court held the death not covered by an accident policy
which excluded injuries sustained "while in or on any vehicle or mechanical
* * *"
device for aerial navigation, or in falling therefrom or therewith
1
Citing Meredith v. Business Men's Accident Association. 7
10 (1931) 226 Mo. App. 143, 42 S. W. (2d) 973.

11 For other cases see Benefit Association of Railway Employees v. Hayden, (1927)
175 Ark. 565, 299 S. W. 995, 57 A. L. R. 622, "while engaged in aeronautics or underwater navigation," recovery allowed; Bew v. Travelers Insurance Co., (1921) 95 N. J.
Law 533, 112 A. 859, 14 A. L. R. 983, "while participating in or in consequence of
having participated in," no liability. (A leading case.)
(1932) 209 Wis. 5, 243 N. W. 410.
(La., 1931) 134 So. 256.
14 (C. C. A. 5, 1927) 17 F. (2d) 370.
15 (1928) 265 Pac. 400.
16 (Mo., 1927) 1 S. V. (2d) 99.
'7 213 Mo. App. 688, 252 S. W. 976.
12
13
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An insured passenger leaped from the plane which had scarcely left the
ground, in Gits v. New York Life. s He was granted his double indemnity
although his clause excepted death from "engaging in submarine or aeronautic
operations."
III. Accidents to Pilots
The pilot is both engaging and participating in aeronautics. This is
equally true of an individual operating a glider. In Irwin v. Prudential
Insurance Co.19 the insured, pilot and sole occupant of a glider, was held
to be engaged in aviation operations.
In several instances, a pilot has sought an advantage from the "in time
20
of war" phrase. He obtained it in Charette v. Prudential Insurance Co.
where his double indemnity clause excluded death as a result of "having
been engaged in aviation21or submarine operations or in military or in naval
services in time of war."
IV.

Miscellaneous Decisions

Louisiana does not recognize an aviation exclusion clause, holding it to
incontestable clause and statute.22 Other states have
be in conflict with the
23
contrary.
the
to
held
An airplane is not a "motor drawn car" within the purview of an accident
policy listing a series of conveyances.2 4 Nor is a ship taking individuals up
for short hops "a public conveyance provided by a common carrier," in the
25
But a corporation
same sort of policy listing a series of conveyances.
26
providing regular flying service is a common carrier.
RECOVERY FOR TORTS BETWEEN SPOUSES
By

DONALD

J.

FARAGE*

Effect of the Marital Status on Contracts and Crimes at Common Law
A brief survey of the legal attributes surrounding the spouses at common
law may be helpful in discussing present problems involving the marital
status. One very soon learns that many of the difficulties and concepts which
have a role in the field of contracts and crimes, where marital status is
involved, also appears prominently in the tort field.
The early concept that, "upon marriage, a man and woman merged, in
legal contemplation, and became one, that one being the husband" was so
18 (C. C. A. 7, 1929) 32 F. (2d) 7.
10 (1933) 5 Fed. Supp. 382.

(1930) 202 Wis. 470, 232 N. W. 848.
Accord, Peters v. Prudential Insurance Co., (1929) 133 Misc. 780, 233 N. Y. S.
500. Contrary results, on this point, were reached in Taylor v. Prudential Insurance
Co., (1931) 253 N. Y. S. 55, and Price v. Prudential Insurance Co., (1929) 98 Fla.
1044, 124 So. 817.
22 Leidenger (Bernier) v. Pacific Mutual, (1932) 139 So. 629.
23 Pacific Mutual v. Fishback, (Wash., 1933) 17 Pac. (2d) 841; American Home
Foundation v. Canada Life, (1931) 260 N. Y. S. 106 (citing Metropolitan v. Conway,
(1930) 252 N. Y. 449, 169 N. E. 642, leading case on the point).
24Monroe's Admr. v. Federal Union Life, (Ky., 1933) 65 S. W. (2d) 680.
25 North American Acc. Ins. Co. v. Pitts., (1925) 213 Ala. 102, 104 So. 21; Brown
v. Pacific Mutual, (C. C. C. 5, 1925) 8 F. (2d) 996.
20 Curtis-Wright Flying Service v. Glose, (C. C. A. 3, 1933) 66 Fed. (2d) 710.
* Professor of law, Dickinson Law School.
20
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